Anglo-Iranian
Community in Greater London
Autumn 2007
Table of Contents
Introduction
The Iranian Regime
Islamic Fundamentalism
Terrorism
Designation of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC),
Defence
Ministry and Qods Force
The Mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
Use of Agents
by the mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
The Mullahs' Agents in Britain
Witness
Statement of Mr. Winston Griffiths
Massoud and Anne
Khodabandeh (nee Singleton)
Unveiled Service to the Mullahs
Witness
Statement Of Abrahim Khodabandeh
Participating in the June 17th Plot
Participating
in the MOIS’s Spying and Terrorist Plot in Paris
The Failed Plot
of the Mullahs’ Regime in London
Participating in the Knife-Wielding Assault Against
Iranian Refugees in France
“Double Agents”
In its 'Annual Report
2005-2006', the Parliamentary Intelligence & Security Committee referred to
increasing international tension over Iran's nuclear programme and its backing
for terrorist groups in the Middle East.
The Committee stated:
"There
is a possibility of an increased threat to UK interests from Iranian
state-sponsored terrorism should the diplomatic situation deteriorate."
The threat is
often repeated by officials of the Iranian regime. On 16 April 2006, The Sunday
Times reported Dr Hassan Abbasi, head of the Centre for Doctrinal Strategic
Studies in the Revolutionary Guards, as saying that 29 western targets had been
identified for suicide attacks. He added:
“We are ready to attack American and British sensitive points if they attack
Iran ’s
nuclear facilities”. Abbasi warned
would-be martyrs to “pay close attention to wily England ”
and vowed that “Britain ’s
demise is on our agenda”.
The threat is why
the government and security services must properly investigate agents of the
Ministry of Intelligence operating in Britain and take steps to stop their
activities.
This paper
concentrates on the role played by the Ministry of Intelligence in terrorist
atrocities across the world. It also identifies agents of the regime operating
in Britain
and the steps needed to deal with the threats they pose.
The Iranian regime
Islamic fundamentalism
Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorism emanating from it represent
the greatest threat to peace and stability worldwide. The heart of this
ideology, which subverts true Islam, beats in Tehran and took shape following the Iranian
revolution when the mullahs seized power. Khomeini’s regime transformed the idea of creating
global Islamic rule to an achievable goal and gave Islamic fundamentalist
groups global backing.
Recent
years have seen a resurgence in the Iranian regime’s fundamentalist ideology,
which has reached its pinnacle with the instigation of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as
President. Early in his Presidency,
Ahmadinejad proclaimed:
“Thanks to the blood of the martyrs, a new Islamic
revolution has arisen and the Islamic revolution of 1384 will, God willing, cut
off the roots of injustice in the world…The wave of the Islamic revolution will
soon reach the entire world.”
Ahmadinejad
has also spoken of the Middle East conflict as
being “the locus of the final war” between Muslims and the west.
Terrorism
The regime has long used terrorism as a policy
instrument to deal with challenges to its survival at home and abroad. At home,
the regime uses terrorism to confront rising public discontent, while boosting
the morale of its oppressive forces, in particular the Revolutionary Guards.
Abroad, the regime uses terrorism to blackmail and gain concessions from
western countries. Some of the earliest examples of this were in the early
1980s when the regime manufactured the hostage crisis in Lebanon . In
exchange for the release of western hostages, the regime secured concessions
from governments including the United States
and France .
It is widely acknowledged
within the international community that the Iranian regime is the most active
state sponsor of terrorism, having been responsible for more than 450 terrorist
atrocities worldwide resulting in thousands of deaths. Whether assassinating
Iranian dissidents in the heart of Europe or carrying out terrorist bombings
across the world, each terrorist operation starts in Tehran where the regime’s most senior leaders
choose their targets and develop their operations. Based on arrest warrants and
investigations conducted by European security services into assassinations of
Iranian dissidents in Europe , it is clear that
the highest ranks of the Iranian regime are involved in each terrorist
operation. This includes the Supreme Leader, the President, the Foreign
Ministry, the Ministry of Intelligence and the Qods Force of the Revolutionary
Guards.
In
Nov 7, 2007 , According to AFP, 145 Interpol member states attending the
world police body's annual general assembly in the Moroccan city of Marrakech,
voted against five leading Iranians, wanted by Argentina for their alleged role
in a 1994 bombing that killed 85 people.
Among those subjected to an arrest warrant
was Iran 's former intelligence chief
Ali Fallahian and the former head of the country's Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen
Rezaei.
In November 2006 they issued arrest
warrants against eight Iranians, including former president Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani and former foreign minister Ali Akbar Velayati.
Designation of Islamic
Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Defence Ministry and
Qods Force
On October 25, 2007, the U.S.
Government designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its
terrorist arm, the Qods (Jerusalem )
Force, Defence Ministry and a number of state-owned banks, companies and
officials for their support of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
The IRGC's raison d'être – as stipulated in the
regime's constitution and reflected in its practices over the past three
decades – is to protect the clerical regime through the export of terrorism and
fundamentalism and brutal suppression in the country. In addition to its
involvement in the production of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear
weapons, the IRGC has carried out hundreds of terrorist operations abroad and
tortured and executed tens of thousands of political prisoners at home.
The mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
The mullahs' Ministry of
Intelligence receives extensive state funding and spearheads terrorist
operations at home and abroad. The
Foreign Ministry uses diplomatic privilege to move agents sent by the Ministry
of Intelligence into countries where terrorist attacks are planned and to
coordinate operations out of Iran ’s
embassies.
According to an April 2006
international arrest warrant issued by a Swiss judge, Ali Fallahian, who
currently serves as a senior security advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader,
masterminded the April 1990 assassination in Geneva of Professor Kazem Rajavi,
the representative in Switzerland of the Iranian regime's main opponents, the
National Council of Resistance of Iran. Fallahian was Iran ’s Minister
of Intelligence at the time of the assassination.
In the spring of 1997, a
Berlin Court ruled that the regime’s top leaders, including the Supreme Leader
and Fallahian, were part of a “special operations committee” that ordered the
murder of four Iranian Kurds in a restaurant in the German Capital in
1992. Other Iranian dissidents
assassinated in Europe include Mohammad-Hossein Naghdi, former diplomat and
representative of the NCRI in Italy, who was assassinated in Rome in 1993,
Zahra Rajabi, member of the NCRI, who was assassinated in Istanbul in 1996, and
Abdul-Rahman Qassemlou, secretary general of the Democratic Party of Iranian
Kurdistan, who was assassinated in Vienna in 1989. These cases illustrate the role played by the
Ministry of Intelligence in terrorist operations in the heart of Europe .
Dissidents inside Iran were also
the victim of death squads sent by the mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence. At
the end of 1998, a number of intellectuals were brutally murdered in Tehran , in what became
known as the "chain murders".
A year later, the regime was forced to admit that the ring leader of the
murder gang was none other than the Deputy Intelligence Minister, Saeid Emami.
But, the crimes of the
mullah's Ministry of Intelligence stretch much further. Suicide attacks incited by Islamic
fundamentalist ideology are a hallmark of Iran ’s terrorism. Two of the
earliest and largest ever suicide bomb attacks carried out by agents of the
regime were on the US Embassy and then the US Marine Headquarters in the
Lebanon in 1983, which killed 258 Americans, including 241 US marines. Again, the mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
was directly involved. The Khobar
Towers bombing in Saudi
Arabia Dhahran in 1996 had all the hallmarks of MOIS involvement.
In 2005, the Revolutionary
Guards announced the formation of a ‘Martyrdom-seekers’ garrison, for the
training of suicide bombers for operations against “Islam’s foes”. On 13 February 2006, speaking to a group of
suicide volunteers, a senior commander of the Revolutionary Guards and the
commander of Martyrdom-seekers Garrison, Mohammad-Reza Jaafari, stated:
“Now that
America is after gaining allies against the righteous Islamic Republic and
wants to attack our sanctities, members of the martyrdom-seeking garrisons across
the world have been put on alert so that if the Islamic Republic of Iran
receives the smallest threat, the American and Israeli strategic interests will
be burnt down everywhere…The only tool against the enemy that we have with
which we can become victorious are martyrdom-seeking operations and, God
willing, our possession of faithful, brave, trained and zealous persons will
give us the upper hand in the battlefield.”
Apart from
carrying out its own terrorist operations, the Iranian regime has long used
foreign groups in the Middle East and
elsewhere to carry out terrorist attacks abroad. These groups, funded and armed
by the regime, have operated throughout Europe, the Middle East and North Africa . Over
the past couple of years, the Iranian regime, and in particular its Ministry of
Intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards, have been most active in Iraq and
Afghanistan, where terrorists armed and funded by the regime are responsible
for widespread killing of civilians and deadly attacks on Coalition forces.
Use of agents
by the mullahs' Ministry of Intelligence
The regime and
its Ministry of Intelligence have focused considerable resources in recruiting
agents in Europe for use against their main
opponents and Iranian refugees. This is
a matter to which Interior Ministries and intelligence services in Europe have drawn attention.
In its May 2002
annual report, Germany ’s
Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV) repeated findings
made previously that the Iranian regime’s Intelligence Ministry had been active
in Germany .
In its report under the heading, ‘People’s Mojahedin of Iran , prime
target of surveillance operations’, BFV states:
“The
Iranian opposition in exile in Germany
remains the focus of surveillance activities of the Iranian Intelligence, VEVAK
(the Ministry of Intelligence),… which keeps them under systematic surveillance
and observation.”
The report also
said that the main target of these surveillance and other activities are the
NCRI and its largest member organisation, the PMOI, which it described as being
active around the world. The report added:
“VEVAK is
apparently concentrating its efforts at the moment on neutralising opposition
groups and their political activities. VEVAK is directing and financing a
misinformation campaign which is also carried out through former opponents of
the regime. As in previous years, the Iranian intelligence service is trying to
recruit active or former members of opposition groups. This in many cases is
done by threats to use force against them or their families living in Iran …
Iranian diplomatic missions and consulates in Germany provide a suitable base
for the country’s intelligence services to gather information on Iranian
dissidents living in Germany. A large quantity of interesting information can
be gathered within the framework of consular services to Iranians. This
information is analysed by Iranian secret service agents working under cover in
Germany
and is enriched with complimentary information. Final decisions on suggestions
on recruitment are made by VEVAK’s headquarters in Tehran . Freer travel between Germany and Iran has provided good facilities
for VEVAK agents to establish their contacts and recruit agents”.
In its 2006 report, BFV maintained,
The 2006 report by the Federal
Office of the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) in Germany makes reference to the activities of the
MOIS thus: "The primary interest of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence
is focused on the People's Mojahedin Organization (MEK) and its political arm,
the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). The MOIS tries to
recruit current and former members of this group to use them as spies in order
to obtain information on the antigovernment activities of this organization…
The MOIS has a secret office in the Iranian embassy in Berlin . MOIS agents work under diplomatic
cover and try to brief and assign those affiliated with its intelligence
services to engage in intelligence gathering activities in Germany ."
The Dutch
Internal Security Service (AIVD), in its May 2002 annual report, exposed the
illegal and secret activities of the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence in
Europe, and in particular in the Netherlands . The report stated:
“One of
the tasks of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security is to track down
and identify those who are in contact with opposition groups abroad. Supporters
of the most important opposition group, the People’s Mojahedin, are especially
under scrutiny of Iranian Security Services more than any other group.”
The report added that officials of the Iranian regime:
“…exert
pressure on Western countries to condemn and ban this group [PMOI]. The
Intelligence Ministry tries to gather information on the People’s Mojahedin
Organisation [and its members]. They are trying therefore, to destabilise the
organisation and demonise the Mojahedin in the host country and thus end their
political and social activities. The Mojahedin are aware of these
activities...Through the National Council of Resistance of Iran , they
inform the authorities of host countries of the secret activities of the
Iranian Intelligence Ministry which is trying to spread negative information
against them.”
More recent
reports record the extensive activities of the Ministry of Intelligence in Europe . European
security services have warned agents of the mullahs about their links with the
Iranian regime. In February 2000, an
agent called Shams Haeri was interrogated by the Dutch security services
about his contacts with the ministry.
Another agent, Karim
Haqi, was warned about his activities against Iranian refugees and
opponents of the regime living in Europe . In a
publication, 'Peyvand', which is published by Haqi he wrote:
"On Tuesday, 1 February 2000, around 4:30 pm, a
Dutch undercover security agent went to Karim Haqqi’s residence in the Elst Township …
After reading a list of names, the agent added: ‘All of you have ties with the
Iranian regime and have formed a large network…’ The security agent said: ‘we
have sufficient information that you have relations with the [Iranian] regime
and it [the regime] pays for your publication. We also know that Mr. Shams
Haeri is connected with the [Iranian] Intelligence Ministry and his brother is
the contact person…’ The security agent said: ‘we want a calm Netherlands and
are not interested in demonstrations and clashes here. It would suit you better
to stop this kind of work and go after your normal business and think about the
future of your children’"
Lord Avebury,
who has extensively researched and written about Iran’s misinformation
campaigns against the PMOI, said about such individuals in his book 'Iran:
State of Terror',
"These persons, due to their low or non-existent
motivation to continue the struggle and maintain their principles, allowed
themselves to be bought by the regime at a later stage. Such people have so far
provided the regime's terrorists in Europe
with most extensive intelligence and political services."
Win Griffiths , a respected
former Member of Parliament who has a great deal of expertise in Iranian
affairs, set out his own experience and that of his Parliamentary colleagues.
Mr. Griffiths explained that whenever a Member of Parliament expresses support
for the goals of freedom and a secular democracy for Iran ,
as espoused by the NCRI and PMOI, they are bombarded with misinformation about Iran 's
main opposition. On some occasions MPs and Peers are contacted directly by the
Iranian Embassy in London ,
while more often they are approached by people claiming to be disaffected
former members of the PMOI who have been recruited by the regime.
The mullahs' agents in Britain
Massoud
Khodabandeh is one of the most active agents of the mullah regime’s Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS) in Britain , and also carries out the
plans of the mullahs’ Gestapo against the Iranian Resistance in a number of
different countries, under the guise of a former member of the People’s
Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI). He was born in Tehran in 1956. In 1974, he left Iran for Britain . In 1980 he joined the PMOI
sympathizers, and in 1986, he was sent to the Iran-Iraq border at his own
request.
In
1993, Khodabandeh informed the organization of his lack of ability to continue
the struggle and proclaimed his defection. In 1998, he traveled to Singapore claiming
he was to attend the World Confederation of Labour there. According to his
brother, however, Khodabandeh met with MOIS agents in Singapore . From
that point on, Massoud Khodabandeh began his activities against the PMOI as an
active agent of the mullahs abroad.
After
a while, Khodabandeh married Anne Singleton. Singleton had begun cooperating
with mullahs’ MOIS in 1997. She regularly visits Iran and acts as a sort of liaison
between Khodabandeh and the MOIS. Singleton accompanied the MOIS at the
notorious Evin prison during a visit to Tehran
by former British Member of Parliament Winston Griffiths. After returning home,
Mr. Griffiths explained that he discovered a British woman’s (i.e. Anne
Singleton) relations with the Iranian regime’s Intelligence Ministry when he
met with her at the Evin prison alongside the mullahs’ agents.
The
MOIS has also set up a website to pursue its goals against the Iranian
Resistance through Massoud Khodabandeh and Anne Singleton in Britain . In
practice, the site, whose only purpose is to vilify the PMOI and the Iranian
Resistance, attempts to provide the groundwork for terrorist activities against
the members of the Resistance, and publishes the misinformation produced by the mullahs’ MOIS,
proliferating it in international organizations and some other websites.
Massoud
Khodabandeh defected after the first Gulf War when he lost the will to continue
the struggle against the mullahs’ regime. In 1993, he wrote in a letter to the
PMOI:
“At
times bombs were dropping from above … As far as I am concerned (and I did not
pay attention to anything else) I was waiting for a bomb, a bullet, or an
incident to die … A person who is awaiting death has already defected in the
sense that he cannot continue the struggle any longer … I was not motivated to
do anything anymore. I was feeling so apathetic that it was even affecting how
I walk, eat, or talk. I felt like I was at an absolute impasse…”
“I
never thought the crudeness of the word ‘defection’ would someday falter in my
mind. But, I constantly feel that at one of these junctures I would not be able
to carry on anymore. After completing each stage of the struggle, I think to
myself, what about the next one? And, this constant question lingers in my mind:
what will you do, where will you go?
“Before
I approached the organization (PMOI), among a thousand other things I did, I
also used drugs … When I went to the (Iran-Iraq) border, I gradually forgot
about the habit. But, during this period that I have been abroad, I feel … that
I am backtracking day by day. I use different methods to escape the reality I’m
in, from sleeping, … to doing all the wrong things, impeding efforts, and in
the end, again drugs. Right now, I don’t know why, but during this time, I have
gone back to drugs on a number of occasions …”
In
1996, Khodabandeh, due to the reasons cited above, began to carry on with his
personal life. In 1997, he married Anne Singleton. Singleton took on some
marginal activities sympathetic to the PMOI in Britain . She was expelled from the
ranks of PMOI sympathizers at the beginning of the 1990s due to ill-behaviour.
After a while, Khodabandeh and Singleton began cooperating with the mullahs and
eventually served the MOIS. According to the witness statement of Abrahim
Khodabandeh (Massoud’s brother) in court, Massoud Khodabandeh’s first contact
with the mullahs’ officials came during his trip to Singapore in 1998. The secrecy with
which his trip took place arouse some suspicion, and in response to those
suspicions, Khodabandeh gave different accounts to different people, which
indicated his attempts to cover up the real intentions for the trip.
Before
the 2003 Iraq
war, the mullahs’ MOIS published a book entitled “Saddam Hussein’s Private
Army” in Anne Singleton’s name, which targeted the PMOI and the National
Liberation Army (NLA). The book provided the groundwork for the Coalition
Force’s attacks against the NLA bases in Iraq in 2003.
Massound
Khodabandeh and Anne Singleton have met with the mullahs’ intelligence agents
in Iran
and some East Asian countries on numerous occasions. On one occasion, the
mullahs’ MOIS openly took Anne Singleton to Tehran and the Evin prison, so that she could
meet with Mr. Winston Griffiths. Mr. Griffiths, a former British cabinet
minister, and a supporter of the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance, said in a
statement at the time when he was an MP in 2004 that he had traveled to Tehran
in order to assess the human rights situation in that country, and as well meet
with Abrahim Khodabandeh and Jamil Bassam. The latter two were Iranian refugees
(who were also British residents), whom the Syrian government, in a deal with
the mullahs, had arrested and extradited to Iran ,
when the two were crossing Syria
on route to London .
Mr. Griffiths’ visit to Iran
occurred after increasing international pressures on the Iranian regime to open
its prison doors to international delegations.
Witness Statement of Mr. Winston Griffiths
to the Proscribed Organisations Appeals
Commission (POAC) in July 2007:
Introduction
I was the Labour Member of Parliament for Bridgend from 1987 to
2005, when I retired. I served as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Wales 1997-8.
Prior to being Member of Parliament for Bridgend, I was a member of the
European Parliament for South Wales for ten
years from 1979 (a two year overlap as MP and MEP). During
my many years in Parliament I became familiar with and worked closely with the
National Council of Resistance of Iran
(NCRI) and its member organisation, the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran (PMOI). As
such, I am very familiar with the two organisations, their leadership, history,
activities and political agenda…
Iranian Regime's Misinformation Campaign:
I am aware, through personal experience and the experience of many
former colleagues in Parliament that whenever a Member of Parliament expresses
support for the goals of freedom and a secular democracy for Iran, as espoused
by the NCRI and PMOI, they are immediately bombarded with misinformation about
Iran's main opposition from a variety of sources. Sometimes MPs and Peers are
contacted directly by the Iranian Embassy in London , which tries to convince
Parliamentarians that they have misunderstood the Iranian regime and been
deceived about the true nature of the NCRI and PMOI. On other occasions,
disaffected former members of the PMOI who have been recruited by the Iranian
regime to spread misinformation against the PMOI approach Parliamentarians.
Lord Avebury, who has extensively researched and written about the Iranian
regime's misinformation campaigns against the PMOI said about these individuals
in his book 'Iran: State of Terror',
"These
persons, due to their low or non-existent motivation to continue the struggle
and maintain their principles, allowed themselves to be bought by the regime at
a later stage. Such people have so far provided the regime's terrorists in Europe with most extensive intelligence and political
services."
On other occasions, Parliamentarians are approached by
organisations that claim to be human rights organisations/NGOs who want to save
PMOI members from the organisation. These front organisations for the Iranian
regime include Nejat Society, Peyvand and Aawa Association. The Iranian regime
also uses numerous websites to spread misinformation against the PMOI,
including those listed below:
http://www.iran-interlink.org
I have read the witness statement of Lord Alton of Liverpool who deals at length with the elaborate and
well-financed misinformation campaign against the PMOI. The Iranian regime
expends large sums of money and makes every effort to tarnish the image of the
NCRI and PMOI abroad and diminish its support generally…
Massoud Khodabandeh and 'Iran-Interlink':
Massoud Khodabandeh is a former member of the PMOI who left the
organisation in the mid-1990s, after which, according to his brother, Iran ’s Ministry
of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) recruited him. He is married to Anne
Singleton and together they run the 'Iran-Interlink' website. At pages … to …
of exhibit "WJG1", appears a copy of the witness statement signed by
Abrahim Khodabandeh and filed with the Commission in 2003, as part of an
application for deproscription previously made by the PMOI. In that witness
statement, Abrahim Khodabandeh explains how his brother travelled to Singapore to meet with MOIS officials and how
Anne Singleton also travelled to Iran for a few months where I
understand she was instructed to set up the 'Iran-Interlink' website…
It is clear from the content of the emails recently disclosed by
the Secretary of State and Anne Singleton’s involvement in the previous
proceedings before the Commission, that Massoud Khodabandeh and Anne Singleton
have close contacts with the Foreign Office. In light of the fact that the
Foreign Office refuses to have any form of contact with Iranian individuals or
organisations who express any form of a positive view about the PMOI, the
contacts between the Foreign Office and Massoud Khodabandeh/Anne Singleton is
peculiar to say the least, especially if it is correct that these individuals
are associated with MOIS.
Moreover, in light of what we have learned since Coalition forces
have been responsible for the security of Ashraf City and the safety of its
residents, as well as the evidence provided on behalf of the Appellants, the
allegations made by 'Iran-Interlink' and Anne Singleton have been proven to be
false. Yet, these allegations continue
to be made by the website. They include allegations of mistreatment of PMOI
members and the allegation that PMOI members are not free to leave the
organisation. In an interview with Newswire, Mr Khodabandeh, referring to the
December 2006 judgment of the Court of First Instance, stated,
“The main victims of this court ruling are the individual cult
members interred in Camp
Ashraf . They are now
unable to leave the cult. Unable to make contact with their families and unable
to return to their homes…”
This is in direct conflict with the statement by Lieutenant
Colonel Julie Norman who said in her letter of 24 August 2006,
“Normally, PMOI members invite their families, friends and colleagues
who live in Iran
or foreign countries to Ashraf for visits. These visitors are welcomed to a
secure environment and hosted by the PMOI…There exists no prison or any
obligation to stay in Ashraf; everyone is free to leave PMOI anytime he/she
wishes to.”
Trip to Iran :
Between 14 and 17 June 2004, I visited Iran
on a humanitarian trip to meet two NCRI members who had been kidnapped in Syria and forcibly, and in breach of
international law, sent to Iran .
One of these individuals was Abrahim Khodabandeh and the other was Jamil
Bassam. They were both being kept in Iran ’s notorious Evin prison.
Evin prison is recognised as one of the most secretive and brutal
prisons in the world. Tens of thousands of political prisoners have been
tortured and executed in the prison. Evin prison is where Canadian-Iranian
photojournalist, Zahra Kazemi met her brutal death in July 2003. She was taking
photographs of Iranian families who had gathered outside Evin prison to learn
of the fate of their relatives – students arrested in widespread anti-regime
protests in Tehran .
In 2004, Shahram Azam, a former military staff physician who left Iran and
sought asylum in Canada confirmed that he examined Kazemi's body and observed
evidence of rape and torture, including a skull fracture, broken nose, crushed
toe, broken fingers, and severe abdominal bruising.
I was surprised to see Anne Singleton in Evin prison. She even had
her young son with her. She was moving around freely and was in direct contact
with Iranian officials in the prison. This is surprising when it is a known
fact that the relatives of political prisoners find it extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to visit their relatives who are incarcerated. Zahra Kazemi’s
body was not even returned to her family. Moreover, international human rights
organisations are denied access to Evin prison.
Apart from meeting Abrahim and Jamil in Evin prison, I met Abrahim
for three meals and Jamil once. On
arriving at the prison, I expected to be taken to meet Abrahim and Jamil
privately (while Teddy Taylor, MP, looked at some other parts of the prison). I
was surprised however to be taken into a large room where some PMOI
members/sympathisers who had been captured in Iran had just begun to make
“confessions” before a TV crew. Whilst listening to the “confessions” of these
PMOI members/sympathisers, I asked Abrahim quietly whether he felt the
“confessions” were true and whether he had been prevented from meeting members
of his family or being restricted on what he read or watched on television in
the UK .
He replied that they were not true and he had not been prevented from seeing
his family, reading newspapers or watching television. I was expecting this
answer because from conversations we had had previously in the UK , he had told me about taking a month off from
NCRI activities while his mother had visited the UK .
I understand that some time after my visit, Abrahim and Jamil made
similar “confessions” to the ones I heard in Evin prison from PMOI
members/sympathisers. I can only underline that the conversations I had with
Abrahim and Jamil during my visit showed they rejected the line put forward in
the “confessions” I heard in Evin prison. Moreover, Abrahim was not comfortable
with the presence of Anne Singleton and I cannot recall a single instance when
they spoke to each other.
Anne Singleton and the Iranian regime had ulterior motives for my
visit and hoped to turn it into a propaganda opportunity for the Iranian
regime. Following my return from Iran , I had to spend a considerable
amount of time rebutting false and misleading reports of my visit made by Anne
Singleton, "Iran-Interlink" and "Iran-Didban"…
Winston
James Griffiths
Witness Statement Of Abrahim Khodabandeh
Massoud Khodabandeh’s brother, Abrahim
Khodabandeh, who has been imprisoned since 2003 when he was extradited to the
Iranian regime by the Syrian government, gave a written witness statement in
2002, in which he exposed Massoud Khodabandeh as a mullahs’ intelligence agent
operating abroad (Annex No.4).
“The person who set up and runs
“Iran-Interlink” is my brother’s wife, Anne Khodabandeh (nee Singleton).
Anne Khodabandeh married my
brother some years ago, but it was not until four years ago that I began to
suspect that she had links with the Iranian clerical regime.
I have been aware for some time
now that my brother, Massoud Khodabandeh, has links with the Iranian Ministry
of Intelligence.
In the early 1980s my brother
left Iran and went to join
the PMOI in Iraq .
He then left Iraq and went
to France
for a time, and then came to this country in 1990. Up until 1994 – 1995 my
brother had some contacts with supporters of the PMOI in London , but then gradually he disappeared.
Since 1996 there have been indications that he has contacts with the Iranian
regime. For instance, I have been told by friends of my brother that he
regularly vanishes for several weeks at a time. I believe that during his
absences he goes to meet the people that he works for. I know that he has
travelled to Singapore ,
which I understand is one of the places where the regime’s agents meet their
contacts.
My suspicions regarding my
sister-in-law arose from the following chain of events. About four years ago
(that is, in 1998) I received a number of urgent telephone calls from people I knew
in the office of the International Red Cross in Baghdad . I was told that an urgent message
was waiting for me from my mother (who lives in Iran ). I found it very strange that
she had sent me a message to the Red Cross in Baghdad . I collected the message from the Red
Cross. In this message, my mother said that she was worried about me and
whether I was safe. I found this very strange because it was easy for my mother
to contact me whether directly, or through my brother Massoud.
I tried to call my mother
straightaway in London
to reassure her that I was well and able to move around freely. However, my
mother had already returned to Iran .
I then spoke to my mother in Iran ,
and asked her why she had left this message for me. She said that my brother
Massoud and his wife, Anne, had asked her to, and had told her about PMOI
members being ill-treated in Iraq ,
and prevented from leaving Iraq .
I found it extraordinary that my brother would this, but I reassured my mother
that I was well and able to move freely. I thought that the message had been
left for me in Baghdad to give the appearance
that I was not able to leave Iraq …
I then learned that Anne
Khodabandeh had travelled to Iran
in the winter of 2001. I found that surprising because, generally speaking, those
Iranians (or their spouses) who are opponents of the regime, do not travel to Iran under any
circumstances (for instance even to see dying relatives or to sort out property
and other matters). This is for two main reasons. First, to travel to Iran , in the
eyes of the regime’s opponents, is to give the regime legitimacy (i.e. treating
it as a normal country). Secondly, because any known opponents of the regime
would be in danger if they travelled there for obvious reasons. As someone who
had been active in the PMOI (and thus an opponent of the regime), as well as
the wife of someone who had been active in the PMOI, she would not have been
safe (or indeed necessarily allowed to leave Iran ) had she not received
assurances from the regime.
Then early this year, when I
was again in Iraq , I
received another call from someone I knew at the International Red Cross office
in Baghdad . I
was again told that there was an urgent message waiting for me.
When I went to collect this
message, I discovered that it was from my daughter. She told me that she was
worried about what has happening to me in Iraq ,
and whether I would be able to leave Iraq . My daughter also asked me to
contact her urgently. My daughter lives in Birmingham with her family.
There was also a letter from
Anne Khodabandeh, telling me that my mother was very worried about me and my
situation, and that my mother wanted me to make contact with her immediately.
I called my daughter from Baghdad and asked her who had asked her to send a letter
to me through the Red Cross in Baghdad ,
and she told me it was Anne Khodabandeh.
I later learned (in spring
2002) when I returned to this country, that Anne Khodabandeh had been in
regular contact with my daughter, trying to find out my whereabouts.
Anne Khodabandeh had also, I
learned, being speaking against the PMOI to my daughter, and had been trying to
distance my daughter from me. I also learned that Anne Khodabandeh had been
trying to persuade my daughter to go with her to Iran .... My daughter did not agree
to travel to Iran
with my sister-in-law. She told Anne Khodabandeh that given my activities with
the PMOI and NCRI she would not be safe if she went there.
I have seen the
“Iran-Interlink” website, which contains within it allegations that are untrue.
For instance, it is claimed that in the last twenty years, the PMOI has changed
from an “armed political force into a cult”. The website also says that
Iran-Interlink is “concerned about members who may wish to leave the
organisation but who are prevented from doing so”, and that the “fundamental
human rights” of PMOI members are being “violated”.
These claims are untrue and are
identical to the propaganda that has been put out by the Iranian clerical
regime and its agents, in an effort to undermine the Iranian Resistance in the
eyes of its Western supporters, over many years…
My mother was visiting this
country in August 2002, and I met up with her a few times at my daughter’s
house in Birmingham .
During one of these visits, it so happened that my brother and sister-in-law
were also there.
Anne Khodabandeh told me quite
openly that she had visited Iran a few months before, showed me her
photographs, and told me that during her visit she had been to Khomeini’s
grave. I found this an incredible statement from someone who purports, through
her website, to be concerned with human rights…”
In addition to the official witness
statement in a British court, Abrahim Khodabandeh has also written letters
providing details about the MOIS’s contacts with his mother in Iran for the purpose of bringing Massoud
Khodabandeh back to Iran
and employing him, and also the sudden change of his income status:
“…About 5 years ago, the MOIS contacted my
mother in Tehran and told her to contact Massoud and tell him that he has
received a pardon, and that he could visit Iran freely, meaning that they will
not harm him if he were to return to Iran. After some time, they contacted my
mother again, and told her that they know he has married a foreign woman and
that he wishes to stay in Britain .
That does not matter, they said. They added that he can come to Iran and see for himself that the situation in Iran has changed and then go back to Britain .
They contacted her again and said that
there is a woman in London who had been active
in the PMOI, has now defected and visited Iran , and has also published a
book. They requested from my mother that she tell Massoud to establish contact
with her, and hear from her that one can easily travel to Iran and
return…
Massoud called my mother once and told her
that he has financial problems, and asked her to sell a small house he owned
there, and send the money to him. My mother sold the house, but the MOIS
confronted her and frightened her by saying that ‘you want to sell the house
and send the money to the PMOI.’ Afraid, my mother then refrained from sending
the money to Massoud.
In the past 6 years that Massoud has ceased
to be part of the struggle, my mother has visited Britain three times to see him. The
first time Massoud was dealing with a horrible financial situation, and was
living with the help of one of my old friends in New Castle . At that time, Anne Singleton was
living in London .
But, during my mother’s third visit, Massoud had bought a big house, and this
was at a time when his wife was unemployed.
Last year, Anne Singleton, with the excuse
of showing her child to my family, visited Iran for a month and also paid a
visit to Khomeini’s grave. My mother’s opinion of Singleton was that she was a
materialistic, cheap, jealous, and mentally unstable individual, who even
envied my mother.”
Participating in the June 17th Plot
One of the most dreadful services of
Massoud Khodabandeh to the mullahs, was his involvement in the shameful June 17th,
2003 plot against the Iranian Resistance in Paris . Two months prior to this incident, the
mullahs’ MOIS agents gathered in Paris
on April 21, 2003, for a “seminar,” and disseminated the MOIS’s lies against
the Iranian Resistance and its President-elect Mrs. Maryam Rajavi. Massoud
Khodabandeh’s name can be seen among the approximately 33 agents and associates
of the MOIS. After a month and a half, on June 17th, 2003, 1300 French police raided the
headquarters of NCRI in Auvers Sur-Oise, and arrested 163 PMOI members and
sympathizers along with Mrs. Maryam Rajavi. Their final goal was to extradite
those arrested to the Iranian regime. Indeed, this attack marked a shameful and
inhumane act by a Western government against those who had taken refuge in its
territory from religious fascism.
This dreadful act took place despite the
fact that according to the Council of Europe’s regulations, all of the member
states were obliged to “coordinated action when it comes to the expulsion of
and blocking of Iran ’s
intelligence and security personnel’s entry into the EU member states.”
On March 11, 2005, Mr. Mohammad
Mohaddessin, Chairman of the NCRI’s Foreign Affairs Committee, William Bourdon
and Francoise Serres, laywers, Jacques Gaillot, bishop of Partenia
and one of the most renowned human rights activists in France, and Patrick
Beaudoin, honorary president of the International Federation for Human Rights,
held a press conference in Paris, in which they revealed the Iranian regime’s
attempts to infiltrate the June 17th case, and also revealed the
roles of some of the regime’s agents who operate under the guise of “former
members of the PMOI.”
Mohammad
Mohaddessin said,
The sources of intelligence for this case
are tied, directly or indirectly, to the mullahs’ MOIS. I have here a document
which clearly shows that from the outset the Iranian MOIS and DST were
coordinating their efforts on this case. This is the “MOIS Bulletin No. 3726/D”
which was sent to senior regime officials on June 23, 2003:
“Item no. 5 – Limited Publication: The said
operation, which is unprecedented, was planned two-and-a-half years ago by the
French security services (DST), and the judicial process for it was designed
gradually, the details of which were shared in the joint meetings with the
above-mentioned agency. According to the plan, 16 senior members of the (PMOI)
in France
will be tried on the grounds of participation in terrorist acts.” This
cooperation continued thereafter.
According to reports we have obtained from
inside Iran ,
in 2004, a number of Ministry of Intelligence agents who posed as former
members of the PMOI, were interviewed repeatedly, either officially or
unofficially, as witnesses. The new claims made in the case, are based
hysterically on the witness statements of 6 well-known MOIS agents. From a
technical standpoint, this report rivals one of the MOIS’s propaganda pamphlets
that the Iranian regime’s foreign embassies distribute in various countries.
These six individuals are: Karim Haghi,
Massoud Khodabandeh, Mohammad-Hossein Sobhani, Adham Tayyebi, Alireza
Mir-Askari, and Mohammad-Hossein Mashoufi. The documented evidence indicating
the services of these agents for the MOIS have been published by the Iranian
Resistance on a number of occasions through the past several years, and have
been provided to international human rights organizations, including Amnesty
International, and responsible government officials, including those in France…
Participating in the MOIS’s Spying and Terrorist Plot
in Paris
After the June 17th plot’s
defeat, and the ensuing disgrace it caused for the mullahs’ regime and the
French government at the time, the mullahs’ MOIS started to mobilize its agents
both inside and outside of Iran
to carry out another appalling act against the Iranian Resistance and Mrs.
Maryam Rajavi in France .
Massoud Khodabandeh was one of the mullahs’ agents who was sent to Paris from Britain
for this assignment.
The mullahs’ MOIS, in coordination with a
French intelligence service, sent its agents to France under the guise of
“former PMOI members” to carry out a gathering and assault against the Iranian
Resistance from March 29th until the beginning of April 2004 in
Paris, and some other areas near the town of Auvers sur-Oise (Mrs. Maryam
Rajavi’s residence) in Val d’Oise province. Younesi, the then-Minister of
Intelligence for the regime, had announced two weeks prior to this, “Today I
ordered my deputy to immediately convey the crimes of the (PMOI) to the
international community for the record” (State-run TV, March 15, 2005).
Immediately after Younesi’s announcement,
some individuals from Iran
and various European countries were called to France . Their travel costs,
including plane and train tickets, stay in Paris , and spending money for purchases
there, were entirely supplied by the MOIS (Annex No.5 ).
During these agents’ gathering in the town
of Auvers
sur-Oise, where the NCRI’s headquarters is located, the mayors and city
officials refused to meet with the agents and ordered them to leave the scene,
citing the illegality of their assembly. In Sergi, when a French resident asked
these agents that if they are truly against the Iranian regime, why they chant
against Mrs. Rajavi, the agents declared that “our most important enemy is Mrs.
Rajavi”! They also said that they want to take actions that would lead to Mrs.
Rajavi’s extradition from France .
Following the incident, some French residents said that after meeting with
these hoodlums they now have a clearer sense of the brutality the Iranian
regime is capable of.
With the exception of Massoud Khodabandeh,
approximately 10 of the agents who were at Auvers sur-Oise that day, came from
the regime’s embassy in France .
A number of them were sent from Tehran
and the rest were the MOIS’s agents and associates.
The Failed
Plot of the Mullahs’ Regime in London
After the defeat of the mullahs’ plot in Paris , the MOIS attempted to set up a meeting against the
Iranian Resistance at a House of Commons building in London , so that it could score much-needed
points by propagating lies and accusations against the Resistance. The main
organizers of this plot were Anne Singleton and Massoud Khodabandeh. The
meeting was cancelled due to the widespread protest by human rights activists
and British MPs from both houses.
Lord Robin Corbett, the Chair of the British
Parliamentary Committee for a Free Iran said in a statement dated November 9,
2005 that,
“The British Parliamentary Committee for Iran Freedom
has been informed that known agents of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry known
as Iran Interlink, a suspected group related to the mullahs’ regime, are
supposed to have a conference on November 10, 2005 in Fielden House in
Westminster. These people have been
dispatched to justify the Iranian regime President’s remarks inciting terrorism
… It is unbelievable that those who use terror inside the country and incite it
outside the country, think that any sane person would listen to them…Their
hysteric accusations about the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran is
indicative of the success of the Iranian resistance in revealing nuclear
deception of the mullahs, their responsibility for killing British military
forces in Iraq and increasing human rights abuses."
Mr. Griffith,
former British Labour MP, also said in a statement in this regard,
“The Iranian regime attempted to conduct a
meeting through Massoud Khodabandeh and Anne Singleton in Parliament so that it
could disseminate false information against the PMOI. In the end, they were not
allowed to have a meeting at the Parliament and were forced to have it at a
hotel instead. In a feeble attempt to divert attention from its shaky
situation, the Iranian regime, has both directly and indirectly resorted to its
old and tried technique of disseminating lies against the main Iranian
opposition – PMOI. A part of this often repeated and failed policy is to set up
a series of press conferences in the United State and Europe with the aim of
disseminating false accusations against the PMOI, such as the accusation that
the PMOI was Saddam Hussein’s private army, or that its members must be put on
trial…
I am deeply worried about the activities of
Massoud Khodabandeh and his wife, Anne Singleton, who try to divert attention
from the threats posed by the Iranian regime and its activities in a democratic
country like Britain, and I am of the opinion that these actions by the
Medieval regime in Iran display its weakness, because it knows that there is no
place for it in the 21st century.”
Adopting such a prudent stance, the British
Parliament did not permit the meeting by Massoud Khodabandeh and Anne Singleton
to take place, and the British police prevented the MOIS’s agents to enter the
British Parliament.
Participating in the Knife-Wielding
Assault
Against Iranian Refugees in France
On June 17, 2007, Massoud Khodabandeh and
Anne Singleton attended a meeting organized by the regime at the Fiap building
in Paris ,
along with a number of professional knife-wielding agents from the
regime’s embassy in France
who were mobilized in order to attack and injure Iranian dissidents.
When asked a few questions by a number of
Iranian dissidents before the meeting, the MOIS operatives, using knives, tear
gas, and knuckle-dusters, violently attacked and wounded the dissidents. Those
wounded were taken to hospital. Upon learning of the brutality of the MOIS
operatives, the French police cancelled the meeting and arrested a number of
the assailants.
As such, this meeting, which was in reality
a cover for the conspiracies hatched by the MOIS against political refugees and
a staging ground for planning terrorist actions against Iranian dissidents,
degenerated into a disgrace and a humiliating defeat for the mullahs’ regime
and its agents outside Iran. The episode further exposed the role of the
mullahs’ President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the MOIS in conspiring against
political refugees and Iranian dissidents.
In addition to carrying out tasks assigned
to them by the mullahs’ MOIS, Khodabandeh and his wife also serve some British
intelligence services and relevant propaganda outlets. The services and
outlets, which in the framework of the policy of appeasement and dealing with
the mullahs must respond to the mullahs’ highest demand for pressuring and
proscribing the PMOI as a terrorist organization, coordinate their activities
with the MOIS. The British services, well aware of Massoud Khodabandeh and his
wife’s affiliation to the Iranian regime’s MOIS, utilize them for the goals
outlined above and provide them with plentiful resources for their missions
against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance. For example, using official and
unofficial channels, these services infiltrate media outlets in Britain (especially the BBC) and other
countries, to propagate misinformation and accusations against the Iranian
Resistance, identifying these accomplices of the Evin prison torturers as
“experts” on Iran
and the PMOI. This explains at least part of the reason for the sudden change
in the financial situation and increasing wealth of these agents.
Massoud Khodabandeh, along with a number of
torturers and MOIS agents, officially and openly communicates and deals with
the “Habilian” association, an official branch of the MOIS, to plot against the
Iranian Resistance. The MOIS has set up several different websites abroad,
including Khodabandeh’s “Iran-Interlink” and “Iran-e Ayandeh” operated by
another agent, Karim Haghi, in addition to a number of sites operated from
within Iran ,
such as those belonging to the “Habilian” and “Nejat” so-called associations. A
quick glance at these sites clearly suffices to reveal the recognizable trail
of the various bodies of the MOIS and their mission against the Iranian
Resistance and the PMOI (Annex No.2 ).
In a letter to Javad Hashemi-Nejad, an MOIS
torturer whose father was one of the most ruthless criminals of the mullahs’
regime, Massoud Khodabandeh writes (in a letter posted on “Iran-Interlink”
website, which is set up in the name of Khodabandeh and Anne Singleton):
“I know that one of the victims of these
blind killings by the PMOI was your father, who died defenceless and unaware …
Although some of my political and ideological views differ from yours, I cannot
help but go beyond these issues, and express my condolences to your family. As
a person who used to be active in this cult, I feel responsible and thus
apologize.”
Othman H. al-Bustan, Ebrahim Khodabandeh, Maryam Sanjabi and
others in Baghdad
Iran Interlink,October 26 2014: … Massoud Khodabandeh from
Iran Interlink visited Baghdad over ten days during October 2014 to gather the
latest information pertaining to the Mojahedin Khalq presence in Iraq.







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