Karim
Haqi
The Iranian
Refugees Association in the Netherlands
Fall 2007
Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorism
associated with it are the biggest threat to global peace, stability, and
security. Islamic fundamentalism, which distorts the religion of Islam and
takes advantage of it toward its malevolent goals, was formed after the mullahs
hijacked the anti-monarchical revolution, obtained political power in Iran in 1979,
and formed a medieval theocracy under the banner of the “Rule of the
Jurisprudent” (concept of “velayat-e
faqih” or absolute rule of the clerics). This regime is essentially at odds
with the modern world and sees its survival in repressing the Iranian people
and exporting fundamentalism and terrorism abroad in the context of its goal
for the creation of an “Islamic Empire.” The regime pursues this sinister
objective by forming and providing full support to fundamentalist groups and
organizations. It also attempts to get its hands on a nuclear weapon in order
to be able to sustain such policies.
As domestic and international crises mount,
especially after the recent war in Iraq, the ruling mullahs have
adopted an aggressive posture. As such, the mullahs conferred the regime’s
presidency to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and one of the most fanatical factions within
the ruling elite, in order to execute their repressive policies at home and
broaden efforts to expand terrorism, fundamentalism, conflict and chaos
throughout the region.
Past experiences and present realities in Iran and the
region highlight the fact that the way to confront the mullahs is neither the
policy of appeasement, the ineffectiveness of which has been proven during the
last three decades, nor a foreign military intervention. The real solution to
the threat of the mullahs lies in democratic change by the Iranian people and
their organized resistance movement. This is precisely what the mullahs fear as
their most serious existential threat, because, as the United States Congress
and many European parliamentarians have noted, the Iranian Resistance is
sustaining a democratic struggle against the mullahs in order to establish
democracy, rule of law, separation of religion and state, and equality for
women in Iran.
The central force within the Iranian Resistance, the People’s Mojahedin
Organization of Iran (PMOI), with its firm belief in a democratic and tolerant
Islam, is the antithesis and the only alternative to a barbaric regime that abuses
Islam in order to justify its dictatorial and expansionist policies. This is
especially true since the Iranian Resistance made the international community
aware of the clandestine nuclear weapons program of the mullahs, and as such
averted a potential global catastrophe. Such awareness made the international
community more aware of the mullahs’ threat and caused it to prevent the
mullahs from being able to acquire nuclear weapons.
The PMOI also revealed the facts about the
regime’s terrorist and fundamentalist activities, especially its meddling in Iraq, by bringing into light the names,
particulars, and bank accounts of more than 32,000 cohorts and agents of the
mullahs in Iraq
and its governmental institutions. As such, the Resistance made the international
community alert of another threat posed by the mullahs, which is indeed
hundreds of times greater than that of the regime’s nuclear weapons program.
Consequently, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its
extraterritorial terrorist arm, the Qods Force, were placed on the list of
proliferators of weapons of mass destruction and the list of terrorist
organizations.
Additionally, the Iranian Resistance exposed
the mullahs’ horrific human rights record through an extensive global
diplomatic and political campaign. As such, it played a decisive role in the
condemnation of the regime at various United Nations organs on 54 different occasions.
It is for these reasons, that the religious
dictatorship ruling Iran,
in conjunction with its repression and assassinations, utilizes every single
resource it has at its disposal to taint and discredit the image of the Iranian
Resistance on the world stage. To reach this objective, the mullahs have
sustained an overwhelming campaign of vilification against the Resistance in a
bid to compel the International community, and specifically Europe and the United States,
into believing that there are no credible alternatives for their regime. They
even claim that the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance, i.e. the mullahs’ biggest
existential threats, are worst and more dangerous than the Iranian regime. As a
result, they want the world to believe that it is best to deal with the current
medieval religious dictatorship ruling Iran, and in return for offering
lucrative trade deals, they expect the world to collaborate with them in
repressing the Iranian opposition movement.
In order to grasp the real extent of the
regime’s apprehension when it comes to the PMOI, it would suffice to note the
comments made by Mike Gapes, chair of the British Parliament’s Foreign Affairs
Committee, in a parliamentary session on November 28, 2007, after returning
from a trip to Iran:
“…When we went to Iran I certainly and I think my colleagues, were
struck by the number of times that the Iranians wanted to raise the issue of
what they call the MKO terrorist organisation or clique or some other term of
that kind to a level of almost of obsession that it was on their program, they
wanted us to talk about it and they raised it in lots of different contexts.”
It is worth noting that the mullahs, in
addition to an official propaganda campaign and resorting to diplomatic efforts
and trade deals against the Iranian Resistance, have unofficially dedicated the
resources and capabilities of several ministries and governmental institutions
along with an annual budget amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars, and agents,
networks, and front organizations (in the guise of “opposition activists”) to
wage a vilifying campaign against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance. This is
because the regime’s status as a hated abuser of human rights (a record stained
with oppression, hangings, stoning, torture, and public executions), and its
export of fundamentalism, terrorism and chaos have severely restricted its propaganda
abilities through official governmental channels.
For this reason, the mullahs’ Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS), which is in reality a notorious organized
crime network engaged in killings, assassinations, surveillance, and a host of
other sinister activities, wages a vilifying campaign against the PMOI and the
Iranian Resistance through its agents and front organizations in European
countries and the US.
These agents are generally used and introduced as “former PMOI members and officials.”
Some of these agents include those who from
the very beginning belonged to the MOIS or the IRGC’s Qods Force, and were
assigned a mission to infiltrate the ranks of the PMOI and the National
Liberation Army (NLA) in Iraq.
After the true identities and mission of these individuals were revealed, the
PMOI sent them back following the completion of investigations. The regime’s MOIS
sends some of these people on missions abroad, so that they can introduce
themselves as “former PMOI members,” who have been tortured and harassed by the
PMOI, forcibly returned to Iran, and have now escaped Iran to seek asylum
abroad. They claim that they are facing threats from both the PMOI and the
Iranian regime. Agents such as Mohammad Hossein Sobhani, Farhad Javaheri-Yar,
and Hossein Sadeqian, fit into this category.
The second category includes individuals that
were at a time opposed to the regime and within the Resistance’s ranks, but due
to the hardships and difficulties demanded by the struggle against the regime,
and because of their inability to face these difficulties, they left the
Resistance and sold themselves to the regime’s MOIS. The PMOI’s relentless
struggle for freedom and democracy against the mullahs’ religious dictatorship
has gathered hundreds of thousands of members and sympathizers around this
movement. According to the regime’s officials, in the early 1980s alone, the
PMOI had organized more than half a million people in Iran (Memoirs
of Hashemi Rafsanjani, regime’s former president).
Throughout this hard struggle for freedom,
more than 120,000 people have sacrificed their lives, executed by the religious
fascism ruling Iran.
Such a difficult road means that some individuals can no longer tolerate the
brunt and leave the Resistance’s ranks to continue on with their ordinary
lives. Such a mechanism of people being drawn to and leaving the ranks, is
characteristic of any resistance movement throughout history, and would
especially be the case for a movement fighting against the most brutal
dictatorship in modern times.
As such, throughout the years, a considerable
number of people have left the Resistance’s ranks and returned to their
personal lives. The overwhelming majority of these individuals continue to be
the Resistance movement’s sympathizers and each works to garner support for the
movement according to his/her abilities. Many of them have countered the MOIS’s
psychological warfare and false propaganda against the PMOI and the Resistance.
However, a small number of people have also been drawn or threatened to
collaborate with the MOIS. Agents such as Karim Haqi, Shams Haeri, Massoud
Jabani, Habib Khorrami, and Massoud Khodabandeh, among others, fit into this
category.
In a book published by the Human Rights Group
at the British Parliament, Lord Avebury writes the following about such agents:
“Another method (used
by the Iranian intelligence service) is using the small number of defectors who
had at one stage cooperated with opposition organizations and individuals.
These persons, due to their low or non-existent motivation to continue the
struggle and maintain their principles, allowed themselves to be bought by the
regime at a later stage. Such people have so far provided the regime’s
terrorists in Europe with the most extensive
intelligence and political services. In addition to providing information on
the assassination targets to the regime, they prepare the political grounds for
the murders of the dissidents by spreading propaganda against the individuals
or organizations they had previously cooperated with, defaming them and
accusing them of being worse than the ruling regime.”
Therefore, the MOIS sends such agents as
“opposition activists” to various places, forms front organizations and
introduces them as “independent” (again, as “opposition”), creates websites,
publishes and distributes volumes of newsletters, brochures, colorful books,
and organizes events and conferences with the help of these agents and
organizations, all in order to execute its political and propaganda campaign
against the Iranian Resistance. These agents and associations deny their true
political identity and links with the MOIS, and present themselves as “former
PMOI members and officials” who still remain opposed to the mullahs in Iran.
Win Griffiths, a former minister and respected
member of the British Parliament, who is an expert in Iranian affairs, has
shared his own and his colleagues’ experiences in this regard. In a statement
to Britain’s
Proscribed Organizations Appeal Commission (POAC) in July 2007, he stated:
“whenever
a Member of Parliament expresses support for the goals of freedom and a secular
democracy for Iran, as
espoused by the NCRI and PMOI, they are immediately bombarded with
misinformation about Iran's
main opposition from a variety of sources. Sometimes MPs and Peers are
contacted directly by the Iranian Embassy in London, which tries to convince
Parliamentarians that they have misunderstood the Iranian regime and been
deceived about the true nature of the NCRI and PMOI. On other occasions, disaffected
former members of the PMOI who have been recruited by the Iranian regime to
spread misinformation against the PMOI approach Parliamentarians.”
As mentioned above, to carry out the MOIS
objectives against the Iranian Resistance, these agents are directed and
operate in the context of a string of front organizations and different
websites, all controlled by the MOIS, in various countries. Some of the MOIS
front organizations in Iran
include the “Nejat association,” “Habilian,” “Victims of Violence,” and
websites under the same names.
Outside of Iran, MOIS runs front associations
such as Iran Payvand, Iran Interlink, Ava, Ghalam, etc., and operates website
under the same names.
Western security services are aware of the
Iranian regime taking advantage of the democratic conditions available to it in
the West to expand its intelligence and spying activities in such countries.
Official German and Dutch
Security Services Reports
The regime and its Ministry of Intelligence
have focused considerable resources in recruiting agents in Europe
for use against their main opponents and Iranian refugees. This is a matter to which Interior Ministries
and intelligence services in Europe have drawn
attention.
The Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BFV) in Germany, in it’s 1999 annual report
noted:
“The principal objective of the Iranian secret
service continues to be the fight against Iranian oppositionists. The People’s
Mojahedin Organization of Iran
(PMOI) and its political wing, the NCRI, are still the top target of the
Intelligence Ministry’s activities. To fight against the activities of the
opposition in exile, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has set
up a series of cultural associations. These operate as a front for the MOIS and
the Iranian regime. Other than this, the MOIS tries to publish various
publications, some in the name of those who introduce themselves as ex-members
of the PMOI, in order to persuade sympathizers to abandon the organization.”
In its May 2002 annual report, Germany’s Federal Office for the Protection of
the Constitution (BFV) repeated findings made previously that the Iranian
regime’s Intelligence Ministry had been active in Germany. In its report under the
heading, ‘People’s Mojahedin of Iran, prime target of surveillance
operations’, BFV states:
“The Iranian opposition in exile in Germany
remains the focus of surveillance activities of the Iranian Intelligence, VEVAK
(the Ministry of Intelligence),… which keeps them under systematic surveillance
and observation.”
The report also said that the main target of
these surveillance and other activities are the NCRI and its largest member
organisation, the PMOI, which it described as being active around the world.
The report added:
“VEVAK is apparently concentrating its efforts
at the moment on neutralising opposition groups and their political activities.
VEVAK is directing and financing a misinformation campaign which is also
carried out through former opponents of the regime. As in previous years, the
Iranian intelligence service is trying to recruit active or former members of
opposition groups. This in many cases is done by threats to use force against
them or their families living in Iran … Iranian diplomatic missions and
consulates in Germany provide a suitable base for the country’s intelligence
services to gather information on Iranian dissidents living in Germany. A large
quantity of interesting information can be gathered within the framework of
consular services to Iranians. This information is analysed by Iranian secret
service agents working under cover in Germany and is enriched with
complimentary information. Final decisions on suggestions on recruitment are
made by VEVAK’s headquarters in Tehran.
Freer travel between Germany
and Iran
has provided good facilities for VEVAK agents to establish their contacts and
recruit agents”.
The 2006 report by the Federal Office of the Protection of
the Constitution (BfV) in Germany
makes reference to the activities of the MOIS thus:
"The primary interest of the Iranian
Ministry of Intelligence is focused on the People's Mojahedin Organization
(MEK) and its political arm, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).
The MOIS tries to recruit current and former members of this group to use them as
spies in order to obtain information on the antigovernment activities of this
organization… The MOIS has a secret office in the Iranian embassy in Berlin. MOIS agents work
under diplomatic cover and try to brief and assign those affiliated with its
intelligence services to engage in intelligence gathering activities in Germany."
The Dutch Internal Security Service (AIVD), in
its May 2002 annual report, exposed the illegal and secret activities of the
regime’s Ministry of Intelligence in Europe, and in particular in the Netherlands.
The report stated:
“One of the tasks of the Iranian Ministry of
Intelligence and Security is to track down and identify those who are in
contact with opposition groups abroad. Supporters of the most important
opposition group, the People’s Mojahedin, are especially under scrutiny of
Iranian Security Services more than any other group.”
The report added
that officials of the Iranian regime:
“…exert pressure on Western countries to
condemn and ban this group [PMOI]. The Intelligence Ministry tries to gather
information on the People’s Mojahedin Organisation [and its members]. They are
trying therefore, to destabilise the organisation and demonise the Mojahedin in
the host country and thus end their political and social activities. The
Mojahedin are aware of these activities...Through the National Council of
Resistance of Iran,
they inform the authorities of host countries of the secret activities of the
Iranian Intelligence Ministry which is trying to spread negative information
against them.”
The Mullah Regime’s
Agents in the Netherlands
Karim Haqi is one of the most loathed MOIS
agents outside of Iran.
He resides in the Netherlands,
but travels with MOIS grants to carry out assigned missions and organize events
and meetings, which the MOIS sets up in the US and various European countries
against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance.
Karim Haqi began to serve the MOIS in 1995. His links with the
MOIS were originally secret, but from 1996 onwards he was in direct and regular contact
with the regime’s consulate in the Netherlands. His contact with the
regime’s consulate in the Netherlands
is an individual identified as “Maqsoudi.” After a while, Haqi turned out to be
one of the most active MOIS agents in the Netherlands and European countries.
After being with the PMOI and the NLA in Iraq, in 1991 during the First Gulf War and the ensuing
bombings of Iraq,
Karim Haqi announced that he cannot continue to stay in the NLA citing
“physical problems.” Haqi and his wife (Mohtaram Babai) requested that they
leave NLA bases and be sent to Baghdad
to continue on with their personal lives. The PMOI transferred Haqi to Baghdad and provided him
with all the necessities for a normal life. In a letter dated November 1992, Haqi wrote
in this regard:
"As you know, following the bombing of Ashraf camp, the
organization (PMOI) transferred me (Karim Haqi Monii, combatant of the
Liberation Army) and my wife and children to a Jalalzadeh urban base in Baghdad city center. This
was of course upon my request and my wife. During this period, in addition to
all facilities which were available for every combatant and members of the
organization, we received twice as much attention and special food and personal
requirements were provided to us. On top of all, a private apartment and a car
for family use in the city were given to us and we received 1,000 Iraqi dinars
every month. Me and my family were not restricted in any way."
After a few months in Baghdad, during which he
was provided with all the required necessities and resources, Karim Haqi
requested that he be sent to the US or Europe. In January 1993 the PMOI paid for and transferred
Haqi and his wife to France.
There, he was helped by the PMOI to obtain a political asylum. All the living expenses
for Haqi and his wife in France
were paid by the PMOI. These included deposit and rent for a place to live,
basic home appliances, monthly expenses, etc.
While the legal status of his refugee
application was not yet resolved, Haqi suddenly decided to go to the Netherlands and
become a refugee there instead. Based on the information and documents obtained
later, it was revealed that the reason for his move to the Netherlands was
his links with the MOIS through his brother.
After cutting ties with the PMOI, Haqi began
to serve the mullahs’ MOIS in carrying out its policies to vilify the PMOI and
the Iranian Resistance. After four years, he claimed that he and his wife
(Mohtaram Babai) were tortured and jailed by the PMOI in Iraq, and that three years later, and because of
such torture and pressures inflicted in Iraq,
his wife committed suicide in the Netherlands.
Karim Haqi’s Wife Commits
Suicide in Protest to his Treason and Corrupt Behavior
After Haqi established contacts with the mullahs’
MOIS through the regime’s embassy in the Netherlands, a large number of means
and resources were made available for him. According to Iranians residing in
the Netherlands
and his friends, Karim Haqi was engaged in extra-marital affairs. After finding
out about this, his wife, Mohtaram Babai, became emotionally distraught. Not
being able to tolerate Haqi’s behavior, in April 1995, Mohtaram Babai committed suicide in
protest to Haqi’s illegitimate relations.
Jamshid Tafrishi, a friend of the couple, who
according to his own testimony cooperated with the MOIS, temporarily cut ties
with the MOIS and revealed some information about the plans and activities of
the MOIS’s network outside Iran.
In his book, “The Plots and Plans of the MOIS against the PMOI,” (p. 60),
Tafrishi writes about Mohtaram Babai’s suicide:
"A few days after the start of the Iranian new year in 1995
(Iranian new year starts on March 21) I telephoned Karim Haqi's home and
Mohtaram Babai, his wife answered and said he was not home. …after making some
complaints about Karim Haqi, Mohtaram said, 'Since we have arrived in the Netherlands he
has turned my life into hell. His dirty doings have reached a level that
sometimes I cannot tolerate and I want to kill myself.' Three days later I heard
that she had committed suicide. When she became certain that Karim Haqi had
extramarital relations with another woman, she made her final decision and
hanged herself from the ceiling of the bathroom in her residence."
According to these sources, the MOIS
instructed Haqi to blame his wife’s suicide on the PMOI.
At first, Haqi had decided to send Mohtaram
Babai’s body to Iran with
the help of the regime’s embassy in the Netherlands. However, the MOIS
suggested that the body be buried in the Netherlands in order to use it as a
propaganda tool against the PMOI. This was done by Maqsoudi (who was in charge
of the network of the regime’s agents at its consulate in the Netherlands).
In return for Haqi’s cooperation, and in the
span of less than a week, Maqsoudi arranged for the travel of a number of
Babai’s family members who had been released from prison to the Netherlands.
After coming to the Netherlands
and discovering Haqi’s status and his role in the story, the Babai family
expressed anger and disgust at what he had done.
Meanwhile, in conjunction with Haqi and
Maqsoudi’s claims at the regime’s consulate in the Netherlands, state-run media
outlets in Iran, such as the Kayhan and Resalat dailies, quoted Haqi in December 1995, writing,
“His wife was tortured in PMOI prisons, and after being released went to the
Netherlands, but despite months of treatment, she finally died.”
Mohtaram Babai’s last letter, which reveals
her reasons for committing suicide, is at the hands of the Dutch police. Every
Iranian refugee and the couple’s friends know that the real reason Babai
committed suicide was her heated conflicts with her husband Karim Haqi.
According to their friends, Ms. Babai continually expressed her anger about
Haqi’s illegitimate relations, such that on numerous occasions the couple’s
fights escalated to physical violence, which could no longer be tolerated by
Ms. Babai, and thus led to her suicide.
Statements by Minister of
Justice and the Interior of the Dutch Government
In 1999, as part of its psychological warfare and lies against the
Iranian Resistance, the MOIS tried to claim that the PMOI had attacked the home
and office of Haqi in Germany
and the Netherlands,
and stole his belongings, on three different occasions, the last one of which
was on March 28, 1998.
He filed a complaint against the PMOI in Arnheim, the town of his residence.
But, the allegations and charges levied were so ridiculous that Arnheim’s
prosecutor formally announced that he does not consider the complaint “worthy to be reviewed within the criminal process
of the Netherlands,”
and thus refused to continue working on the complaint.
With
regards to the allegations made by Karim Haqi and other agents of the mullahs’
regime in the Netherlands
against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance, a number of the representatives of
the Dutch Parliament, posed some questions to the ministers of the Interior and
Justice in the Netherlands.
In reply, the said ministers rejected the validity of the accusations (See the
minutes from the Parliamentary proceedings, Dutch Parliament, 1998-1999, No.
1435):
Questions:
1- Are you aware of an
article published in the de Volkskrant daily about the people's Mojahedin on
April 28?
2- What is your view and
judgment about allegations made by Karim Haqi (a veteran member of the
organization) regarding the activities of the Mojahedin in the Netherlands in
which, according to him, has advanced and turned into a Mafia Style
organization whose task is to smuggle people and collect money using fraudulent
methods and putting pressure on its opponents?
3- Does the Dutch
government have any other information on possible illegal activities of the
Mojahedin in the Netherlands?
Answers:
Answer to first
questioni is: Yes
Answer to questions 2
and 3: If there had been any such activities or any documents in that regard in
the Netherlands, they have not reached the police or the Justice Department,
except a complaint submitted by Karim Haqi about a case of robbery and his
article in de Volkskrant on April 28, 1999. The Mojahedin are known in The Netherlands as
an organization that organizes peaceful demonstrations. It is also apparent
that they collect contributions in the streets under an affiliated charity
called SIM. In that respect, there has been some conflict on the way the
collectors deal with the people to raise contributions. But there is no record
or document indicating that Mojahedin have been involved in smuggling people or
committing any other serious illegal acts of a criminal nature.
“Iran Payvand”: An MOIS Front
Association
“Iran
Payvand” is one of the MOIS’s front associations abroad. It was set up by the
MOIS through Karim Haqi. A publication entitled “Payvand” is also meant to
carry out the regime’s propaganda against the PMOI and the Iranian Resistance.
This publication is mailed to Iranians free of charge. The MOIS collects the
postal addresses of Iranian refugees with the help of its agents and provides
Haqi with this information so that he can send them the publications. The goal
of mailing such publications is to pressure Iranian refugees to return to Iran as well as
to vilify the Iranian Resistance. As well, some of the funds sent by the MOIS
to Haqi and other agents for their activities are wired into the Payvand
publication’s bank account.
The
mullahs’ MOIS has also rented a three storey building in Kleve, Germany,
for Haqi and a number of other agents to conduct their activities. The reason
the MOIS has chosen Kleve as the “Iran Payvand”
association’s office is that from this location it is faster and easier for
Haqi to carry out his assignments for the MOIS in Germany,
the Netherlands, and Belgium.
Another
MOIS assignment for Karim Haqi and his associates is to send free MOIS
publications, penned in his own name or other names, against the PMOI and the
Iranian Resistance (published in the Netherlands or Iran), to foreign political
and social figures (in Europe, US,
Canada, Australia, etc.) who support the Resistance (See Attachment 1).
Haqi
also sends thousands of copies of costly MOIS publications against the PMOI,
free of charge, and in the form of “independent” publications, to the
Resistance’s friends and neighbors in France
(especially the town of Auvers
sur-Oise and other cities in Val d’Oise).
Saeed Emami, an MOIS
Deputy, Acknowledgements
Jamshid
Tafrishi, an MOIS agent and one of Haqi’s former associates, writes in his
book, “The Plots and Plans of MOIS against the PMOI”:
"In March 1996, Karim
Haqi met with Saiid Emami (one of the senior officials of the Ministry of
Intelligence who was in charge of terrorist operations abroad against members
of the opposition. According to officials of the regime, he had carried out 150
successful operations outside Iran)
in Singapore.
"Peyvand publication
was a cover to receive money which was to pay for members of the network…
around mid June 1997, Reza, Emami's deputy, contacted and said that we had to
give the task of publishing a journal to Karim Haqi… the journal fulfills part
of our requirements and asked me (Jamshid Tafreshi) to write articles to be
published in the journal under the name of Karim Haqi or others… following the
publication of the first issue of Peyvan in August 1997, Amir Hossein Taqavi
(general director of the European bureau of the Ministry of Intelligence who
was the head of the Special Operations since 1992 and directly led terrorist
operations abroad) called me (Jamshid Tafreshi) and asked me to give my views
on the journal."
Therefore,
Haqi receives money and other resources directly from the PMOI in Tehran. He is also in contact
with other well-known MOIS agents in Europe.
In order to keep these links secret, for a while, Haqi’s meetings with MOIS
officials were being held in some east Asian countries such as Singapore.
Through
its lobbies and political connections in various countries, the regime also
arranges meetings for Haqi and other MOIS agents, presenting themselves as
“opposition activists,” with human rights figures and organizations and
parliamentarians, so that it can discredit the Iranian Resistance in their eyes
through its vilification campaign.
However,
Iranian residents and refugees wonder how Karim Haqi and other agents like him
who claim that they are just a group of refugees and have no other source of
income, can afford the costs of lucrative trips (at times in groups of tens) to
various European destinations and the US, and set up so-called seminars and
conferences. Iranians wonder who pays the high costs for extensive propaganda
against the PMOI, setting up TV networks like Payvand TV, publishing various
materials such as Payvand, Iran Payvand, etc., which are managed and run by the
agents. These activities, in light of their nature and objectivem, which is to
vilify the Iranian Resistance, and the lavish costs associated with them,
cannot be paid for by anyone other than the MOIS and its abundant budget.
Dutch Police Warning to
Karim Haqi with Regards to His Links with the MOIS
The
cooperation and contact of Karim Haqi and other agents with the mullahs’ MOIS
in the Netherlands
and other countries, has not gone unnoticed for the Dutch police and security
services.
In February 2000, the Dutch police visited
Haqi and a number of other regime agents, and issued warnings to them with
regards to their activities and links with the MOIS in the Netherlands and countries like Norway, Germany,
and Canada.
Karim Haqi himself confessed to this in his “Iran Payvand” (See Attachment 2):
On Tuesday, February 1,
2000, an agent of the Dutch secret service arrived at Karim Haghi’s residence
in Elst and, after initial talks… He said: “All of you are in contact with the
Iranian regime and have formed a large network… You must tell us who else is in
contact with the Iranian regime … We have enough information about your ties
with the regime and know that your publication is being financed by the Iranian
regime. We also know that Mr. Shams Haeri is in touch with the regime and his
contact with the Ministry of Intelligence is his brother. He has traveled to Singapore
to meet his MOIS contacts… We want the Netherlands calm and peaceful and
do not like to have demonstrations and fighting here. It is best for you to
abandon this sort of work at once and go after a normal life and think of your
children’s future.”
On the same day another
secret agent was present at the parking lot near the workplace of Mrs. Roya
Roodsaz, Karim Haghi’s wife, and when she was about to get into her car, he
introduced himself and told her that he intended to talk to her. He talked
about Haghi’s activities and where the funds for Peyvand publication were
coming from. The secret agent told her that Karim and his friends have formed a
large network and all of them are in touch with the Iranian regime. Karim has
once traveled to Cyprus
in this regard.
On the same day, six
persons in groups of two approached Mehdi Khoshhal, Bahman Rastgoo and Mrs.
Nadereh Afshari in three German cities, Cologne, Wiesbaden and Hannover and
asked about the contacts and the circulation of Peyvand publication, how it was
financed, etc. In the first week of February, Messrs. Shams Haeri, Mohammad
Reza Eskandari and his wife Tahereh Khorrami were subjected to questioning (by
the Dutch security service).
Despite
warnings by the security services in Germany,
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
and Canada, Karim Haqi and
his associates in the Netherlands
and other countries continue their contact and cooperation with the mullahs’
MOIS.
Exploiting Human Rights
Organizations in order
to Abuse Human Rights
On
January 16, 1996, Karim Haqi and 11 other agents of the regime, met with
Professor Maurice Copithorne, the UN Special Human Rights Representative, in
Geneva, and claimed that they had been tortured and imprisoned by the PMOI. They
unsuccessfully tried to convince Prof. Copithorne, who was in charge of
monitoring the human rights situation in Iran, to accuse the PMOI, which
struggles for freedom and is itself the biggest victim of human rights
violations by the mullahs, of human rights abuses! It is common knowledge,
moreover, that it is the Iranian regime that has been condemned on numerous
occasions by the UN, the European Parliament, and other human rights organs,
for its barbaric human rights abuses.
Similarly,
as the head of other teams of MOIS agents, Karim Haqi met with Amnesty
International, and the Human Rights Watch representative in Germany, the
details of which were revealed at that time by the Iranian Resistance and
Iranian refugees, through which human rights organizations were made aware of
the regime’s plots. Many of the European parliamentarians in various countries
who are familiar with MOIS propaganda tactics carried out by Haqi and other
agents can testify about them.
Paolo
Casaca, co-chairman of the Friends of a Free Iran committee at the European
Parliament, in a statement dated November 29, 2006, pointed to the extensive
efforts made by the MOIS, through its agents, to conduct a vilifying campaign
against the Resistance, and noted (See Attachment 3):
“…Once my efforts on behalf of the
resistance movement became public، I began to receive dozens of dubious
letters from unknown individuals who claimed to be opposed to the regime، but also criticized the
Mojahedin. It did not work. The next stage was somehow more sophisticated. This
time it was not the Iranian regime or unknown individuals، but people who claimed to be
former members of the organization، whose aim was، to put it bluntly، justifying the crimes
committed by the terrorist regime ruling Iran.
“I also received some very slick
booklets that had the appearance of being published by genuine cultural
associations. But،
after reading through them،
I could easily discern that the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security
(MOIS) was hiding behind all the glossy pages. I have gone through all the
allegations such as "terrorism،" "attacking civilians،" "imprisonment of
dissidents،"
"cult-like behavior،"
and a great deal more. I have seen no merit in these allegations.
“Karim Haqi has been collaborating
with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) since 1995. Haqi
operates out of an outfit called "Payvand". His extensive contacts
with the MOIS even drew attention from the Dutch internal security service.
They interrogated him on several occasions and warned him about his contacts
with and receiving money from the MOIS…”
Arranging Legal Cases
against the Iranian Resistance
One of
the more recent MOIS initiatives in Europe,
which Karim Haqi and other agents of the regime have been tasked to carry out, has
been to try to form cases against the PMOI and the National Council of
Resistance of Iran, by providing misinformation to government officials and
intelligence services sympathetic to the mullahs.
Prior
to former mullahs’ President Mohammad Khatami’s visit to France in March 2005, the MOIS
attempted to gather all its agents from various countries and gather them in
the town of Auvers sur-Oise and the surrounding areas northwest of Paris, to
pressure and prevent the Iranian Resistance and its sympathizers from
organizing a demonstration against Khatami’s visit. The agents’ assembly, which
according to Agence France Presse included about 50 MOIS agents, was faced with
angry reaction from French residents. French newspapers reported on the mullah
agents’ disgraceful assembly and interviewed residents of Auvers sur-Oise
(Attachment 4):
Page 14 - L’Écho - Le Régional - mercredi 13 avril 2005
APRES LA
MANIFESTATION DES OPPOSANTS
Les
Moudjahidins
dénoncent la provocation
La démonstration de l’Iran Payvand Association devant les mairies d’Auvers-sur-Oise et de Méry
a laissé un goût amer aux Moudjahidins et aux habitants acquis à leur cause.
C’est peu de dire que les Moudjahidins du
Peuple installés à Auvers-sur-Oise et leurs amis Auversois ou
Mérysiens ont peu goûté la manifestation provocatrice du groupe qui s’intitule
Iran Payvand
Association, la semaine dernière.
Les uns et
les autres ont été indignés de ce qu’ils considèrent comme
une grossière
intrusion de personnages plus que douteux, sans doute téléguidés par un régime iranien jugé abject, pour lancer des accusations sujettes
à caution.
Un panneau
calicot a particulièrement
indigné, à juste titre. On y voit des photographies de
sympathisants des Moudjahidins s’immolant par le feu, voici deux ans, après l’opération de
police. Et comme seule légende « Bruguière, héros de la lutte contre le terrorisme ». Un manque d’humanité élémentaire qui ne peut que provoquer le mépris.
L’affaire Zahra Kazemi
Mais sans
doute les partisans des mollahs n’en sont pas à une monstruosité près. Il suffit de se rappeler le sort de la journaliste irano-canadienne
Zahra Kazemi, après son
arrestation en juin 2003 pour avoir photographié une prison iranienne et morte quatre jours plus
tard. Les autorités de Téhéran ont toujours refusé de rendre son corps à sa famille, et pour cause. Selon un médecin iranien, Shahram Aazam, qui avait pu
voir son cadavre, elle avait le nez fracturé, le crâne fendu, des doigts cassés, les ongles arrachés, un orteil « en bouillie » et le vagin « complètement lacéré » à la suite d’un « viol brutal », peut-être avec un morceau de bois. Un traitement que les
mollahs ont sans doute trouvé « normal » puisque le régime des mollahs a acquitté le principal suspect de ces tortures et
attribué la mort de Zahra à un « malaise » ! Que les trublions qui ont manifesté à Auvers
aient proclamé «vive le juge Bruguière» ne peut qu’interpeller
la conscience civique et morale des Français. Certains se sont étonnés que l’ةcho donne la semaine dernière la parole à M. Karim Haggi, le peu reluisant leader du
groupe de manifestants anti-Moudjahidin. Mais c’est précisément l’honneur de
notre journal de donner la parole à chacun, contrairement à ce qui se fait en Iran. Ce qui justifie de revenir sur cette affaire pour
apporter notre point de vue et celui des Auversois.
La parole à chacun
les
Moudjahidins du peuple d’Auvers-sur-Oise
ne sont pas les moins indignés. Leur porte-parole, Aladdin Touran, a tenu à répondre aux graves accusations contre la Résistance iranienne : « Ce qui s’est passé le 1er avril fait partie d’une campagne de désinformation menée par le ministère iranien des renseignements. Exaspérés et dépités par l’ampleur du soutien que les
Français et surtout les Valdoisiens apportent à la Résistance iranienne et à Madame Radjavi, présidente de
la République élue par cette résistance, les mollahs en Iran ont essayé de fomenter des troubles dans la région tout
en cherchant à diaboliser la Résistance ».
Fomenter des troubles
Comme par
hasard, 15 mars 2005, le mollah Ali Younessi, ministre des renseignements, qui dirige
cette campagne, avait annoncé : « J’ai donné l’ordre de porter à la connaissance de toutes les instances internationales et dans les plus brefs délais, les crimes commis par les Modjahedines." Aladdin Touran nous raconte la suite :
« Auparavant, en réponse aux demandes formulées par Téhéran pour exercer des pressions contre la Résistance iranienne, un service français avait rétorqué qu’étant donné la popularité de ce mouvement en France, il faudrait réunir un nombre important d’Iraniens à Auvers-sur
Oise pour afficher une opposition à la Résistance. C’est alors que l’on pourra sous prétexte d’atteinte à
l’ordre publique, augmenter la pression sur les
Iraniens d’Auvers. Mais
la campagne s’est soldée par un échec total et les mollahs n’ont pu rassembler qu’une cinquantaine de leurs agents, bien connus,
à Auvers-sur-Oise. Certains venaient
de l’ambassade du régime en France, d’autres arrivaient d’Iran et le reste de divers pays d’Europe comme l’Allemagne, les Pays-Bas, la Suède, la Norvège, l’Angleterre
ou la
Suisse. Ils sont abhorrés par les
Iraniens pour leur collaboration avec la dictature. Pas même un seul Iranien résidant en France ne se trouvait parmi eux, bien
qu’ils soient des milliers à habiter dans
l’Hexagone. »
Manipulation
Selon les
Moudjahidins d’Auvers, l’association hollandaise Iran Payvand,
organisatrice de la «manifestation», est liée au ministère des renseignements de Téhéran. Selon sa revue, « Payvand », au moins
dix individus parmi ceux venus à Auvers le 1er avril ont été questionnés par les
services hollandais, allemands, anglais, norvégiens, et autres en raison de leurs relations
avec les services iraniens. Selon Peyvand, la police hollandaise a affirmé à Karim Haggi, le président de
ladite association : « Nous
disposons
de
documents suffisants pour démontrer que vous êtes en
relation avec le régime
iranien qui vous paye, entre autres, les frais de cette revue. »
Sans
commentaires...
Jean-François
DUPAQUIER
Several
members of the Paris bar association also
released a statement in Paris,
which condemned the MOIS agent gathering in Auvers sur-Oise, and revealed the
gathering’s links with the mullahs’ MOIS (Attachment 5):
…Aujourd’hui, 1er avril 2005,
d’informations concordantes et recoupées, il semble que des agents des services
secrets iraniens aient décidé d’être présents dans la zone d’Auvers-sur-Oise
pour y mener des actions inconnues mais dont l’objectif ne peut être que de
discréditer le CNRI, voire de donner de la consistance à la criminalisation
dont ils sont artificiellement l’objet.
Ils mettent en garde les autorités
françaises sur toutes formes de complaisance qui pourraient conduire à
favoriser des comportements dont le seul objet est de tenter de créer, par la
provocation, des troubles à l’ordre public.
Les Avocats des Membres du CNRI rappellent
que ce sont ces mêmes services secrets iraniens qui « recrutent » des
anciens membres de l’organisation pour les transformer en témoins providentiels
pour les Magistrats Instructeurs…
Supporting the Mullahs’
Criminal President Ahmadinejad
Subsequent
to the failed plot of the mullahs in Paris,
the MOIS attempted to set things aright by organizing a meeting against the
Iranian Resistance at a building affiliated with the British House of Commons.
The meeting was cancelled due to extensive protests on the part of
representatives from both houses as well as human rights activists. Lord Robin
Corbett, chairman of the British parliamentary committee for Iran Freedom, said
in a statement issued on November 9, 2005:
“The
British Parliamentary Committee for Iran Freedom has been informed that known
agents of the Iranian Intelligence Ministry known as Iran Interlink, a
suspected group related to the mullahs’ regime, are supposed to have a
conference on November 10, 2005 in Fielden House in Westminster. These people have been dispatched to justify
the Iranian regime President’s remarks inciting terrorism … It is unbelievable
that those who use terror inside the country and incite it outside the country,
think that any sane person would listen to them…Their hysteric accusations
about the People’s Mojahedin Organisation of Iran is indicative of the success
of the Iranian resistance in revealing nuclear deception of the mullahs, their
responsibility for killing British military forces in Iraq and increasing human
rights abuses."
Failing
to set up their meeting at the building affiliated with the House of Commons,
the mullah regime’s agents gathered in a hotel in London to continue to propagate MOIS lies and
accusations against the Resistance.
Despite
various statements and invitations by the MOIS for this meeting, not even a
single British citizen, politician, journalist, nor even Emma Nicholson, or
anyone from the Netherlands,
showed up at the meeting. Karim Haqi, Massoud Khodabandeh, and Anne Singleton
(Khodabandeh), were the only organizers of this event.
Extremely
angered by the disgraceful failure, Haqi began to defend and support the
mullahs’ President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. He said, “Ahmadinejad talks with
courage and honesty. The threat from the PMOI is more than the nuclear threat
of the regime.”
“Peace and Solidarity”
Demonstration in Support
of the Regime’s Nuclear Program
Recently,
subsequent to the blacklisting of the regime’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps and other organs as terrorists and proliferators of weapons of mass
destruction by the United States, and in the midst of the adoption of a third
round of sanctions at the UN Security Council against the mullahs’ nuclear
program, Karim Haqi continues his activities under the banner of “global peace
movement.” Haqi, along with the regime’s other agents and lobbies in countries
like the Netherlands, Germany, and France,
is active in setting up superficial events in France. These events are organized
by the regime through its front associations with the aim of supporting the
mullahs’ nuclear projects, and also opposing the more decisive policies of the
new French government vis-à-vis the adventurism of the mullahs’ regime. For
example, on October 27, 2007, Haqi and Javad Firouzmand headed a so-called
demonstration, which took place after a month-and-a-half-long MOIS-run campaign
in France
to support the regime’s nuclear program under the banner of “Peace, Solidarity,
and Opposing War.” This demonstration failed miserably. Voice of America TV
(October 27, 2007) reported that only 11 people had attended the so-called
demonstration! The regime’s embassy employees and MOIS agents who had attended
the “demonstration,” began to leave the scene in shame.
The
intelligence centre of the regime’s embassy, which had organized the above
protest, could only take well-known MOIS agents from various countries to the
scene. These agents included: Karim Haqi from the Netherlands;
Javad Firouzmand and Jahangir Shadanlou from France;
Mohammad Hossein Sobhani, Ali-Akbar Rastgou, Amir Movassaqi, Ali Qashqavi, and
Abbas Sadeqinejad from Germany;
Termadoyan from Switzerland, and 2 agents from the regime’s
embassy and MOIS in France
(See Attachment 6).
Iranian Refugees in the Netherlands
Demand
the Expulsion of Regime Agents
The
activities of Karim Haqi, Shams Haeri, Massoud Jabani, and Habib Khorrami, in
the guise of refugees and opposition activists, against the true Iranian
dissidents and political refugees, and the main opposition in the Netherlands,
have provoked hatred among Iranian refugees. They have, on many occasions,
complained about the spying activities of Karim Haqi to the French police.
Last
year, 150 Iranian political refugees wrote a letter to the Dutch Prime Minister
requesting the expulsion of the MOIS agents and spies from the Netherlands.
They wrote in their letter:
“Your
Excellency Mr. Balkenende,
Prime
Minister of the Netherlands
We,
as Iranian refugees in the Netherlands,
request from the Dutch government to expel the Iranian regime’s spies from
Dutch territory.
Recently,
the regime’s agents in the Netherlands
have gathered personal information about political refugees and sent them to the
Iranian regime’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Subsequently,
the MOIS began to contact our families in Iran,
and through intimidation tactics and threats, it tried to make us return to Iran. We have
left our country due to this regime’s suppressive policies and are now
considered Dutch citizens …
We
have learnt that the Nejat association, which is linked to the mullahs’
infamous MOIS, resorted to sending greeting cards and books to us, by using our
personal contact information it received from the regime’s spies in the Netherlands.
Therefore,
we, the Iranian refugees in the Netherlands,
cannot feel safe, and request that these well-known mullah agents be expelled
immediately. Some of these agents include:
1.
Ahmad
Shams Haeri
2.
Karim
Haqi Moni
3.
Habib
Khorrami
4.
Masoud
Jabani
This
letter is signed by 150 Iranian refugees residing in the Netherlands and
is being sent to the Dutch Prime Minister. Iranians residing in the
Netherlands, like millions of other Iranian refugees around the world, demand the
expulsion of the mullah regime’s agents from their places of residency. This is
because the spying activities of these agents under the direction of the
regime’s embassies and MOIS, leads to the endangerment of the lives of Iranian
refugees.”
In response to the political refugees’ representative, the director of
the Middle East and North Africa desk at the Dutch Foreign Ministry confirmed
the receipt of their letter about the spying activities of the regime’s agents
in the Netherlands,
and stressed that the letter had been handed over to responsible authorities.
“…I
received your letter to the Dutch Foreign Minister on behalf of 150 Iranian refugees residing in
the Netherlands, through
which you expressed concern about the Iranian regime’s intelligence services,
and as you said, the regime’s spying activities in the Netherlands. I
have submitted your letter to the relevant officials.
Sincerely,
Director
of the Middle East and North Africa desk”
European Union Council of
Ministers on April 29, 1997 stressed on the “cooperation among European
governments to guarantee that no visas are issued to Iranians with intelligence
and security missions,” and called on all member states to “adopt coordinated
measures for deporting and preventing MOIS personnel to enter European
countries.”
Attachment
1 – Lord Corbett’s Statement about the mullahs’ MOIS Activities
Lord Corbett of Castle Vale
Dear Colleague
It is no surprise that the fundamentalist
regime in Iran
spends a deal of time and money trying to discredit and demonise their main
opponents، the coalition NCRI and its member the PMOI.
I know that MPs and Peers have been sent
literature from organisations describing themselves as NGOs or human rights
organisations seeking to discredit the PMOI. These include:
• NEJAT Society
• Iran-Interlink
• PEYVAND
• AAWA Association
• Iran
Didban
The most active of these is Iran-Interlink
run by husband and wife team Masoud and Anne Khodabandeh (Anne Singleton)
in Leeds. They never mention the appalling
state of human rights and their allegations are merely a rehash of those made
by the regimes Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).
Anne Singleton regularly travels to Iran
as set out in a witness statement filed in the courts here in November 2002 by
Ebraham Khodabandeh، her brother in law. He gave details of his brothers
co-operation with MOIS including trips to Tehran
and East Asia for face-to-face briefings.
Their front organisation also carry out harassment campaigns against MPs and
Peers who support the efforts of the resistance to bring democracy and respect
for human rights to Iran.
The mullahs have a sophisticated and
well-financed operation against the resistance. A useful summary of these
misinformation campaigns is the Mission Report produced by a delegation from
the European Parliament who visit Camp
Ashraf in Iraq in July 2005. If you have not
seen this، I would be happy to send you a copy.
It is، of course، for you to decide whether to respond to the mullahs letters but
you may wish to tell them to take you off their mailing list.
Lord Corbett of Castle Vale
Chairman، British Parliamentary
Committee for Iran
Freedom
Attachment 2 – Dutch Security Services Issue Warning to Karim Haqi
Peyvand
Publication
of Political-Cultural Association of Peyvand
...
On February 1, 2000,
around 16:30, an agent of
the Dutch secret police went to the residence of Haqi in the township of Elst. Subsequent to reading a list of names, the
secret police said: “All of you are in contact with the Iranian regime and have
set up a major network. We have plenty of information that you are in contact
of the Iranian regime and the Iranian regime pays for your publication.”
1. AbolHassan Bani Sadr
2. Alireza Nourizadeh
3. Bahman Niroumand
4. Nasser
Khajeh Nouri
5. Parviz Yaghoubi
6. Mehdi Khanbaba Tehrani
7- Mehdi Khoshal
8- Asghar Borzou (Sweden)
9- Bahman Rastgou ( the Netherlands)
10-Jafar Baghal-Nejad (Norway)
11- Hassan Khalaj ( Norway)
12- Abed Haj-Esmail ( Great Britain)
13- Hadi Shams Haeri (the Netherlands)
14- Ghassem (Mohammad Towfiq Assadi, the Netherlands)
15- Hassan Alijani (the U.S.)
16- Karim Haqi Moni (the Netherlands)
17- Ms. Nadereh Afshari ( Germany)
Attachment 3 – Statement Issued by European parliamentary committee
Friends of a Free Iran about MOIS Activities
colleagues،
I
have come across،
as you might have been،
with a well-orchestrated propaganda and disinformation campaign by the Iranian
regime primarily aimed at tarnishing the image of the main Iranian resistance
movement،
the National Council of Resistance of Iran and its affiliated organizations، such as the People's Mojahedin (PMOI).
This
campaign inevitably reminds me of what Hitler's propaganda minister، Josef Goebbles، said once، "Tell a lie that is big enough and
repeat it often enough،
and the whole world will believe it."
Once
my efforts on behalf of the resistance movement became public، I began to receive dozens of dubious
letters from unknown individuals who claimed to be opposed to the regime، but also criticized the Mojahedin. It did
not work. The next stage was somehow more sophisticated. This time it was not
the Iranian regime or unknown individuals، but people who claimed to be former
members of the organization،
whose aim was،
to put it bluntly،
justifying the crimes committed by the terrorist regime ruling Iran.
I
also received some very slick booklets that had the appearance of being
published by genuine cultural associations. But، after reading through them، I could easily discern that the Iranian
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) was hiding behind all the glossy
pages. I have gone through all the allegations such as "terrorism،" "attacking civilians،" "imprisonment of dissidents،" "cult-like behavior،" and a great deal more. I have seen
no merit in these allegations.
This
propaganda campaign is not lost to European security services either.
German
Security Service،
the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)، wrote in its annual 2005 report، "Iran's
Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) has several opposition groups
under surveillance in Europe. Particularly the
People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and the National Council of
Resistance of Iran (NCRI) are the focus of MOIS's attention. For collecting
information and spying activities،
Iran's
intelligence service (MOIS) uses a network of agents who have defected from
these organizations. The agents are invited to travel to Iran for briefings."
In an
earlier report in 1999،
BfV wrote that the Iranian Resistance "continued to be the focus of the
intelligence interest of the Iranian intelligence service… In its fight against
the Iranian opposition-in-exile،
VEVAK [MOIS] makes use of so-called "cultural associations". These
are cover organizations founded as directed by VEVAK and acting in accordance
with Iran's
interests and wishes. In addition،
the Iranian service initiates anti-MEK [PMOI] publications which in part are
published by former MEK activists and have the aim of persuading the readers of
these publications to turn their backs upon this organization."
The
Dutch Security Service،
AIVD also wrote،
"The Iranian Ministry of Intelligence tries to gather information on the
Mojahedin through its members and ex-members as much as possible. Intelligence
Ministry officers are instructed to spread negative information against the
People's Mojahedin Organization (and its members)."
Against
this backdrop،
I would like to briefly unmask one of the most notorious of these agents، who are the ringleaders of the MOIS
campaign of demonizing the resistance.
Karim
Haqi
Karim
Haqi has been collaborating with the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and
Security (MOIS) since 1995.
In
the spring of 1995،
four years after having no contact with the PMOI، he claimed that he had been imprisoned and
tortured by the PMOI in Iraq
and began to churn out a variety of allegations. In late 1996، Haqi and a number of MOIS operatives went
to see the United Nations Human Rights Commission's Special Representative، Prof. Maurice Danby Copithorne، in Geneva
and claimed that they had been imprisoned and tortured by the PMOI. They
unsuccessfully tried to convince him to devote part of his report to the
violations of human rights by the PMOI.
Haqi
operates out of an outfit called "Payvand". His extensive contacts
with the MOIS even drew attention from the Dutch internal security service.
They interrogated him on several occasions and warned him about his contacts
with and receiving money from the MOIS. Haqi describes one such encounter in
his publication،
Peyvand : "On Tuesday،
1 February 2000،
around 4:30 pm،
a Dutch undercover security agent came to my residence in the Elst Township…
After reading a list of names،
the agent added: 'All of you have ties with the Iranian regime and have formed
a large network…' He added: 'We have sufficient information that you have ties
with the [Iranian] regime and it [the regime] pays for your publication… It
would suit you better to stop this kind of work and go after your normal
business and think about the future of your children' ."
Other
well-known operatives of the MOIS in Europe
are Massoud Khodabandeh،
who،
along with his British wife،
Anne Singleton،
runs a website called Iran-Interlink،
Hadi Shams Haeri،
Jaafar Baghal-Nejad،
Behzad Alishahi،
Nowrouz-Ali Rezvani،
Massoud Tayebi and Jamshid Tahmasbi.
As
for the specific allegations of Mojahedin mistreating their
"disaffected" members،
I and another colleague in the European Parliament، André Brie from Germany، went to Camp Ashraf،
accompanied by a British lawyer،
Azadeh Zabeti،
in summer of 2005.
We investigated all of the
allegations in this regard،
which were also raised in a report by Human Rights Watch. We found absolutely
no truth in those allegations. We published the results of our thorough
investigation in a book entitled،
"The Iranian Mojahedin: Mission Report." http://www.paulocasaca.net/PMOI-EN/index.htm
Sincerely،
Paulo
Casaca MEP
Co-Chair، Friends of a Free Iran
European
Parliament
Brussels
Attachment 4 – L’Echo Journal Story on the MOIS Agents’ Gathering
in Auvers sur-Oise
Attachment 5 – Statement Issued by the Paris Bar Association
COMMUNIQUE
Des
Avocats des Membres et Sympathisants du CNRI
Les Avocats des membres du CNRI, depuis presque deux
ans, n’ont cessé de rappeler que les charges soi-disant recueillies contre
leurs clients étaient inexistantes, et que la procédure initiée avec vacarme le
17 juin 2003, était le résultat direct des pressions du Gouvernement iranien.
Tout est fait pour maintenir un contrôle judiciaire
le plus longtemps possible, des membres du CNRI, y compris en laissant entendre
récemment que la nouvelle frontière des Magistrats Instructeurs serait un
chimérique dossier de « blanchiment ».
Les pressions du régime Iranien
sur les opposants sont historiquement connues en Europe. Les méthodes utilisées
pour les infiltrer et les disqualifier, la préparation d’actes de terrorisme
par les services secrets iraniens ont été décrites par les services de
renseignements allemands en 1997, 2000 et 2002 et les services secrets
néerlandais en 1998, 2000.
Aujourd’hui, 1er avril 2005, d’informations
concordantes et recoupées, il semble que des agents des services secrets
iraniens aient décidé d’être présents dans la zone d’Auvers-sur-Oise pour y
mener des actions inconnues mais dont l’objectif ne peut être que de
discréditer le CNRI, voire de donner de la consistance à la criminalisation
dont ils sont artificiellement l’objet.
Les Avocats des Membres du CNRI
s’interrogent sur le niveau de relations actuelles, notamment à l’occasion de
cette opération entre les services secrets iraniens et la DST.
Ils mettent en garde les autorités françaises sur toutes
formes de complaisance qui pourraient conduire à favoriser des comportements
dont le seul objet est de tenter de créer, par la provocation, des troubles à
l’ordre public.
Les Avocats des Membres du CNRI rappellent que ce sont
ces mêmes services secrets iraniens qui « recrutent » des anciens
membres de l’organisation pour les transformer en témoins providentiels pour
les Magistrats Instructeurs.
Les mêmes Avocats soulignent que simultanément, les
autorités d’enquête semblent faire preuve d’un activisme extraordinaire, pour
tenter de donner de la consistance aux accusations de
« blanchiment », alors que, simultanément, se multiplient des
initiatives de toutes parts, pour installer artificiellement des soi-disant
parties civiles dans le dossier de la procédure.
Tous ces faits interviennent à la veille du voyage de
Monsieur KHATAMI, Président de la République Islamique d’Iran, et alors que les
tentatives du régime iranien pour se doter de l’arme nucléaire sont au cœur de
ces manœuvres diplomatiques.
Maître Henri LECLERC,
Maître William BOURDON, Maître Patrick BAUDOUIN Maître Bernard DARTEVELLE
Maître François SERRES, Maître Marie-Laure BARRE, Maître Delphine MOUKARZEL,
Avocats au Barreau de Paris.
Attachment 6 – MOIS Agents’
Demonstration in Paris
Karim Haqi with a number of MOIS agents in the
“peace” demonstration supporting the mullahs, attended by 11 agents at the Trocadero Square in
Paris
Karim Haqi among other MOIS
agents in the town of Auvers Sur-Oise,
France.
Right to left: Alain Chevalerias, a French agent; Massoud Khodabandeh from Britain; Jabani
